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 Several individuals have asked for an assessment on the potential industry effects of the 
abortion provisions in the Senate Managers Amendment made available on December 18th, 2009.  
Our earlier analysis of the Stupak/Pitts Amendment can be found at 
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_publications/pub_uploads/dhpPubli
cation_FED314C4-5056-9D20-3DBE77EF6ABF0FED.pdf   
 
Taken together, the provisions of the amendment can be expected to have a significant impact on 
the ability or willingness of insurance issuers to offer Exchange products that cover a full range 
of medically indicated abortions.  Furthermore, as with insurance laws generally, and for the 
reasons stated in our earlier analysis, the amendment could be anticipated to have considerable 
spillover effects.  This is because companies that issue insurance products (or administered 
products in the case of sales to self-insured plans) obviously desire to sell these products in as 
many markets as possible.  If one purchaser market places significant restrictions on one or more 
aspects of product design, it is likely that sellers will attempt to design their products to a 
common denominator, so that the product can be sold across all markets in which the company 
desires to do business. This is particularly true with modern health insurance coverage products, 
where the concern is not only the coverage but the provider network through which coverage 
will be obtained.  Negotiating the elements of such a product is extremely difficult, and it is just 
as difficult to have to explain to providers that some of their patients will be insured for certain 
medical procedures while others will not.  
 
The Senate amendment (§1303) provides as follows: 
 
• Section 1303(a) provides that states may “elect to prohibit abortion coverage in qualified 
health plans offered through an Exchange in such state if such state enacts a law to 
provide for such prohibition.” A state making this election could reach all of the markets 
to which state insurance law applies, both for products sold in the Exchange and those 
sold outside the Exchange.  Together these markets could represent a considerable 
proportion of all insured persons in a state, particularly states without large self-insured 
employer markets.  Furthermore, because the amendment reaches the design of the 
product itself, it extends beyond the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde Amendment deals with 
the use of federal funding to directly pay for abortions, not with the nature of products 
sold by private insurers.   Issuers doing business in such states presumably may 
determine that it is not sensible to sell a product covering medically indicated abortions in 
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any of the state’s geographic markets, regardless of whether the purchaser is an 
individual in the exchange or a self-insuring employer.  
 
• Section 1303(b) also allows issuers to offer products (unless prohibited under state law) 
that include many types of medically indicated abortions whose funding is prohibited 
under the Hyde Amendment.  At the same time however, the amendment appears to 
require that the issuer collect –“from each enrollee in the plan without regard to the 
enrollee’s age, sex, or family status” -- a separate payment for the prohibited abortions.  
Payments would have to be strictly segregated, subject to state insurance commissioner 
oversight and adherence to federal segregation requirements.  For several reasons this 
provision could be expected to chill issuers’ willingness to sell products that cover a 
range of medically indicated abortions. They would have to comply with complex audit 
standards and more importantly, they would have to collect an additional fee from each 
member of their plan, a step that could be expected to encounter broad resistance.   (It is 
also not clear what the consequences would be for plan members who do not make the 
payment or whether non-payment would place them in arrears).  The more logical 
response would be not to sell products that cover abortion services.  
 
 
